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Abstract 
We discuss net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided 
market model. Platforms sell Internet access services to consumers and 
may set fees to content - and application providers on the Internet. 
When access is monopolized, for reasonable parameter ranges, net 
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increases the total industry surplus as compared to the fully private 
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1. Introduction 
The Internet is the primary global network for digital communications.  A 
number of different services are provided on the Internet, including e-mail, browsing 
(using Internet Explorer, Firefox, Opera or other browsers), peer-to-peer services, 
Internet telephony (Voice over Internet Protocol “VOIP”), and many others.  A 
number of different functions/applications run on top of the Internet browser, 
including information services (Google, Yahoo, MSN), display of images, 
transmission of video and other features.  
 
Since the inception of the Internet, information packets are transported on the 
Internet under “net neutrality.”  This is a regime that does not distinguish in terms of 
price between bits or packets depending on the services for which these bits and 
packets are used or based on the identities of the uploader and downloader.  The 
typical contract of an Internet service provider (ISP) with a customer gives access to 
the customer to the whole Internet through a physical or virtual pipe of a certain 
bandwidth.  Similarly, an ISP buys from an Internet backbone network access to the 
whole Internet through a physical or virtual pipe of a certain bandwidth in a service 
called “transit.” “Transit” delivers access to the buyer to the whole Internet and 
therefore the buyer/ISP does not need to have any contractual relationship with any 
other ISP except its backbone provider.1 
 
The price a customer pays to an ISP for Internet access depends crucially on 
the availability of competing ISPs for this customer.  Customers that are not 
locationally constrained and can connect to the Internet at many locations can 
negotiate very small connection charges.  Content/applications providers are typically 
not locationally constrained and have negotiated very small Internet access charges.  
In contrast, residential customers typically face a local monopoly or duopoly and have 
much higher charges. 
 
As search services, video services and digital distribution of content over the 
                                                 
1 ISPs can also accept payment in kind, that is, barter, called ‘peering,’  Peering is a restricted service 
whereby two interconnecting networks agree not pay each other for carrying the traffic exchanged 
between them as long as the traffic originates and terminates in the two networks.  For a more detailed 
 3
Internet are growing, Internet broadband access providers AT&T, Verizon and a 
number of cable TV companies have recently demanded additional compensation for 
carrying valuable digital services. Ed Whitacre, AT&T’s CEO, was recently quoted in 
BusinessWeek referring to AT&T’s Internet infrastructure: “Now what they would 
like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them do that because we have 
spent this capital and we have to have a return on it.” 2  Naturally, no one is using the 
Internet for free, since both sides of an Internet transfer pay.3  AT&T’s president, 
together with Verizon and cable TV companies, are asking for the abolition of “net 
neutrality.”  AT&T and Verizon and some cable companies would like to abolish the 
regime of net neutrality and substitute it with a pricing schedule where, besides the 
basic service for transmission of bits, there will be additional charges by the Internet 
operator for services applied to the originating party (such as Google, Yahoo or 
MSN).  The access network operators have also reserved the right to have different 
charges based on the identity of the provider even for the same type of packets, for 
example to be able to charge Google more than Yahoo for the same transmission. 
 
In abolishing net neutrality, telephone and cable companies are departing from 
the “end-to-end principle” that has governed the Internet since its inception.4  Under 
the end-to-end principle, computers attached to the Internet that are sending and 
receiving information packets did not need to know the structure of the network and 
could just interact end-to-end.  Thus, there could be innovation “at the edge” of the 
network without interference from network operators.5  The way the Internet has 
operated so far is a radical departure from the operating principles of the traditional 
digital electronic networks predating it, such as Compuserve, Prodigy, AOL, AT&T 
Mail, MCI Mail and others.  These older electronic networks were centralized with 
                                                                                                                                            
description, see Economides (2005, 2007). 
2 Interview with Ed Whitacre, BusinessWeek November 7, 2005. 
Q. How concerned are you about Internet upstarts like Google (GOOG), MSN, Vonage, and others? 
A. How do you think they’re going to get to customers? Through a broadband pipe. Cable companies 
have them. We have them. Now what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going 
to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it. So there’s 
going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay for the portion 
they’re using. Why should they be allowed to use my pipes?  
The Internet can’t be free in that sense, because we and the cable companies have made an 
investment and for a Google or Yahoo! (YHOO) or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these 
pipes [for] free is nuts! 
3 See Economides (2005, 2007). 
4 For more on the end-to-end argument, see e.g. Saltzer, Reed and Clark (1984). 
5 See Cerf (2006a, b) for a detailed explanation of this argument. 
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very little functionality allowed at the edge of the network.   
 
From an economics point of view, the departure from net neutrality regulation 
will have six consequences.  First, it will introduce the possibility of two-sided pricing 
on the Internet where a transmission company controlling some part of the Internet 
(here last mile access) will charge a fee to content- or application firms “on the other 
side” of the network which typically did not have a contractual relationship with it.  
This is over and above the traditional one-sided payment to its ISP for “transit 
service” whereby a content or applications provider connects to the Internet.  Second, 
it will introduce the possibility for prioritization, which may enhance the arrival time 
of information packets originating from paying content- and application firms “on the 
other side,” and may degrade the arrival time of information packets that originate 
from non-paying firms.  In fact, the present plans of access providers are to create a 
“special lane” for information packets of paying firms while restricting the lane for 
non-payers without expanding total capacity.  By manipulating the size of the paying 
firms’ lane, the access provider can guarantee a difference in the arrival rates of 
packets originating from paying and non-paying firms, even if the actual improvement 
in arrival time for paying firms’ packets is not improved as compared to the case of 
net neutrality.  Third, if access providers choose to engage in identity-based 
discrimination, they can determine which of the firms in an industry sector on the 
other side of the network, say in search, will get priority and therefore win.  This can 
easily be done by announcing that prioritization will be offered to only one of the 
search firms, for example the one with the highest bid.  Thus, determining the winner 
in search markets and other markets “on the other side” will be in hands of access 
providers.  This can create very significant distortions since it seems reasonable to 
assume that the surplus “on the other side” of the Internet is a large multiple of the 
combined telecom and cable TV revenue from residential Internet access.6  Fourth, 
new firms with small capitalization (or those innovative firms that have not yet 
achieved a significant penetration and revenues) will very likely not be the winners of 
the prioritization auction.  This might reduce innovation.  Fifth, access networks 
might favor their own content and applications rather that those of independent firms.  
Finally, since the Internet consists of a series of interconnected networks, any of these 
                                                 
6 See Economides (2008) for a more detailed discussion of this issue. 
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networks, and not just the final consumer access network, can, in principle, ask 
content and application providers for a fee.  This can result in multiple fees charged 
for a single transmission and lead to a significant reduction in trade on the Internet, 7 
similar to the reduction of trade in medieval times when the weakening of the state 
power of the Roman Empire allowed multiple fees to be collected by many 
independent city powers along a trading route. 
 
In this paper, we primarily deal with the first issue in the previous paragraph 
by formally building a model of a two-sided market. We thus only concentrate on the 
issue of one-sided versus two-sided pricing (which we think should play a larger role 
in the debate) and ignore other (admittedly important) issues such as exclusion of 
content providers, quality of service variations, dynamic investment incentives and 
price discrimination. We explicitly model the Internet broadband market as a two-
sided network consisting of broadband users on one side and content and applications 
providers on the other.  Prices imposed on both sides have direct implications on the 
number of broadband consumers as well as on the number of active providers of 
content and applications. In our framework, net neutrality is defined as a restriction 
that Internet Service providers cannot directly charge content providers for access to 
consumers, i.e., the price on one side of the market is constrained to zero. This is a 
direct consequence of the fact that net neutrality would prohibit Internet service 
providers from inspecting packets to determine from where they originate. If they 
cannot tell packets apart, they cannot charge content providers for access to 
consumers, since they do not know whom to charge. Note that we only consider direct 
charges to content providers over and above charges for sending and receiving traffic 
from the Internet backbone. Figure 1 shows the conceptual structure of the Internet 
connecting consumers and content providers. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The imposition of multiple margins by independent producers of complementary goods was first 
discussed by Cournot (1838).  In Cournot’s setup, there are two complementary components that can 
be combined in fixed proportions to produce a composite good.  In the setup, each component is 
produced by a single firm, i.e. we have two independent monopolists.  In a second setup, both 
components are produced by the same firm (integrated monopoly).  He showed that the price of the 
composite good will be higher with independent monopolists than with integrated monopoly.  This is 
because each of the independent monopolists does not take fully into account the effect of his price 
increase on the market.  This has been called “double marginalization.” 
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Figure 1: We take the Internet Backbone competitive and consider the price for Internet 
access that consumers pay and possible direct fees imposed on content providers 
by ISPs. These fees are possible if net neutrality is abolished and an ISP can 
determine the origins of packets it delivers to consumers. 
 
We discuss the incentives of a monopoly broadband Internet access network, 
starting from net neutrality, to initiate a positive fee to the content- and applications 
side of the market, besides the price it charges to users/subscribers.  We show that 
while a monopoly broadband Internet access network has an incentive to charge a 
positive fee to content providers, for some parameter ranges when the monopolist 
would like to charge content providers, an increase in such a fee above zero decreases 
the total surplus. However, there also exist parameter values for which this result is 
overturned.  Further, we show that in a duopoly setting with multi-homing content 
providers and single-homing consumers, net neutrality increases the total surplus as 
compared to duopoly competition between platforms that would impose positive fees 
on content providers. The reason is the surplus loss arising when some content 
providers choose to remain inactive when fees are positive. 
 
Despite a considerable literature discussing the rights and legal issues of net 
neutrality and its abolition, the literature on economic analysis of this issue is thin.  
Three papers have emerged in relation to the second issue above, i.e. the prioritization 
of information packets.  In a paper relating to the establishment of multiple “lanes” or 
quality options for application providers, Hermalin and Katz (2007) analyze a model 
where net neutrality is equivalent to a single product (quality) requirement.  The effect 
of restricting the product-line is that low valuation application providers become 
excluded; medium valuation providers purchase higher and more efficient qualities 
and high valuation application providers purchase a lower valuation and less efficient 
Consumers ISPs Internet 
Backbone 
Content 
Providers 
Price Fee 
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qualities.  The impact on total surplus is ambiguous, but the set of applications 
available is reduced.8  Focusing on congestion, Cheng, Bandyopadhyay and Guo 
(2008) model two content providers who can avoid congestion by paying ISPs for 
preferential access.9  They find that abolishing net neutrality will benefit ISPs and hurt 
content providers.  Depending on the parameter values, consumers are either 
unaffected or better off.  Social welfare increases when net neutrality is abandoned 
and one content provider pays for access but remains unchanged when both content 
providers pay.  The reason why the consumer surplus may increase is that it is always 
the more profitable content provider that pays for access and hence, gets preferential 
treatment.  This benefits consumers of the more profitable content provider because 
congestion is reduced.  However, it means a loss for consumers of the less profitable 
content provider that does not pay for preferential access, since there is an increase in 
the congestion costs.  They also find that the incentives for the broadband provider to 
expand its capacity are higher under net neutrality regulation since more capacity 
leads to less congestion. Since congestion decreases, Internet services become more 
valuable (to the benefit of ISPs).  If net neutrality is abolished, their model predicts 
reduced investment incentives due to congestion becoming less of a problem. 
 
Choi and Kim (2008) study both a static and a dynamic setting focusing on 
how innovation incentives are affected by net neutrality. They find ambiguous results 
regarding the impact of net neutrality regulations on welfare, but highlight that in a 
dynamic setting, net neutrality regulation affects the incentives of the network 
operator by either allowing the network operator to charge more/less for access or by 
allowing the network operator to sell rights to prioritized delivery of content. 
Investing in improving capacity implies that the network operator can charge less for 
prioritized delivery, so incentives to expand capacity can be lower without net 
neutrality regulation. Concerning content providers, the authors find that since the 
network operator can extract returns from investments through selling first priority 
access to consumers, content providers may have stronger investment incentives 
under net neutrality regulation. However, it is not clear that the network operator 
wishes to extract all returns on potential investments since he has incentives to 
                                                 
8 Hermalin and Katz (2007) do not address the issue of the reduction of the “standard” lane for Internet 
access that is likely to reduce consumers’ welfare. 
9 See also Jamison and Hauge (2008). 
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encourage some investment by content providers. 10 
 
In contrast to the above literature, we focus on the issue of two-sided pricing 
made possible by the abolishment of net neutrality regulation.  Hence, our paper is 
closely related to the literature on two-sided markets (e.g. Armstrong (2006), Caillaud 
and Jullien (2003), Hagiu (2006), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Nocke, Peitz 
and Stahl (2007)). In particular, we build on the approach in Armstrong (2006) by 
extending it to study net neutrality regulation, and by studying optimal regulation of 
one price in a two-sided market while the platforms are allowed to optimally set the 
other price in response. Related is also Hagiu (2007) who discusses open versus 
proprietary platforms, where open platforms imply zero prices on each side of the 
market. In contrast, we allow one price to be positive while the other is constrained to 
zero under net neutrality regulation. 
 
We have structured our paper in the following way.  We first present and 
evaluate the impact of net neutrality regulation in a monopoly model in section 2.  In 
section 3, we extend the monopoly model to a duopoly setting with multi-homing 
content providers. The paper is concluded in section 4. 
 
2. Platform Monopoly 
We start with a platform monopoly model of a two-sided market.  A platform 
                                                 
10 In addition, Chen and Nalebuff (2007) analyze competition between complements and briefly touch 
upon the issue of net neutrality.  Some services that are offered by an ISP may also be offered over the 
Internet (such as Vonage or Skype).  There is a concern that the ISP would like to disrupt the quality of 
the services of its competitors to further its own product.  However, the authors show that this would 
not be profit maximizing in their model since a monopolist ISP benefits from valuable complements 
such as VOIP services (a higher price for internet access could be charged instead of trying to force 
consumers to its own VOIP service). Hogendorn (2007) analyzes the differences between open access 
and net neutrality and emphasizes that these are different policies that may have different implications.  
Hogendorn interprets net neutrality in a slightly different way than most of the literature.  Open access 
refers to allowing intermediaries access to conduits (so that intermediaries such as Yahoo can access 
conduits like AT&T at a nondiscriminatory price), while net neutrality is interpreted to mean that 
content providers have unrestricted access to intermediaries (so that Yahoo cannot restrict which 
content providers can be reached through its portal).  Under net neutrality, a smaller number of 
intermediaries enter the market due to decreased profits.  Open access, on the other hand, increases the 
entry of intermediaries since they now have free access to conduits. In general, Hogendorn finds that 
open access is not a substitute for net neutrality regulation.  Finally, Economides (2008) discusses 
several possible price discrimination strategies that may become available if network neutrality is 
abolished. He presents a brief model showing that the total surplus may be lower when the platform 
imposes a positive fee on an application developed for it due to the fact that the fee raises the marginal 
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(say a telephone company, such as AT&T) sells broadband Internet access to 
consumers at a subscription price p  and possibly collects a fee s  from each content 
or application provider to allow the content to reach the consumer.  We assume that 
the platform monopolist (and later in the paper, duopolists) only offers linear fee 
contracts, i.e., it does not offer quantity discounts and does not offer take-it-or-leave-it 
contracts with lump-sum fees. 11   Furthermore, we abstract from the full complexity 
of the Internet, which consists of many interconnected networks and assume that the 
networks that lie between the access provider and the content provider are passive 
(see figure 1).12  Finally, we assume that the cost of providing the platform service is 
c  per consumer.  
 
2.1 Consumers 
Consumers are interested in accessing the Internet to reach search engines (e.g. 
Google), online stores (e.g. Amazon), online auctions (e.g. eBay) and online video, 
audio, still pictures, and other content. Consumers are differentiated in their 
preferences for Internet access.  A consumer i ’s location (type) ix  indexes his/her 
                                                                                                                                            
cost of the application and hence, also its price. 
11 One could alternatively view our setup also as only considering consumer and content provider use 
of a high speed dedicated “last mile laser” offered to content providers needing a high level of quality 
of service to ensure that, for example, HD video transmissions work well.  
12 As noted earlier, if the in-between networks also attempted to charge a fee to content providers, there 
would be the possibility of high prices because of double or multiple marginalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Interaction of consumers with content providers and vice versa through the 
platform. 
 
Platform
 
Consumers
Content  
Providers
 
a = value 
(network effect) 
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preference for the Internet, so that consumers with a lower index place a higher value 
on the service. Consumers pay a transportation cost equal to t  per unit of distance 
“traveled.”13  We assume these to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0 1]x∈ ,  
with the platform located at 0x = (this specification allows for an easy extension to a 
duopoly setting; see the appendix for a discussion of the case where the platform is 
located at the center of the interval).  Consumer i ’s utility is specified as  
i cp iu v bn tx p= + − −        (1) 
where v c>  is an intrinsic value that a consumer receives from connecting to the 
Internet irrespective of the amount of content,14 b  is the marginal value that a 
consumer places on an additional content provider on the Internet and cpn  is the 
number of content providers that are active. 
 
2.2 Content Providers 
Content providers rely on advertising revenue per consumer, a , to generate 
revenue.  We assume content providers to be uniformly distributed on the unit interval 
and have a unit mass.  We make the simplifying assumption that content providers are 
independent monopolists, each in its own market, and therefore do not compete with  
each other.  Each content provider then earns can , where cn  is the number of 
consumers paying the platform for access to content providers.  Thus, a  is the value 
for a content provider of an additional consumer connected to the Internet. 
 
Content providers are heterogeneous in terms of the fixed costs of coming up 
with a business idea and setting up their business.  A content provider indexed by j  
faces a fixed cost of jfy , where jy  is the index of the content provider’s location on 
the unit interval.15  The marginal costs for serving advertisements to consumers are 
                                                 
13 Assume that the market is not covered and demand is differentiable. 
14 Such benefit may arise from Internet-enabled services that do not crucially depend on the number of 
other Internet subscribers or availability of content.  An example may be television services bundled 
with Internet access. 
15 We assume that the “market is not covered” in the sense that some content providers will always 
have such high fixed costs that they decide not to enter the market. Further, we assume demand for 
access to consumers to be differentiable. 
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taken to be zero.16  Each content provider may have to pay the platform a lump-sum 
fee equal to s  to gain access to users. This fee is assumed to be the same for all 
content providers and it is set by the platform.  Thus, a content provider j ’s profit is17  
 j c jan s fyπ = − − . (2) 
Net neutrality regulation equals the case where s  is zero.  As discussed earlier, the 
traditional fees paid for transit service by content/applications providers are small, and 
here take them to be zero at the status quo net neutrality regime.18  Figure 2 shows the 
interaction between consumers and content providers through the platform. 
 
2.3 Demand 
In this two-sided market, the demand for content depends on the expected 
amount of content provided since more consumers will connect to the network if more 
expected content is available.  In addition, the provision of content depends on the 
expected number of consumers.  That is, when the expected number of consumers is 
e
cn  and the expected number of content providers is 
e
cpn , the marginal consumer, ix , 
who is indifferent between subscribing to the Internet and remaining outside, is 
 
e
cp
i c
v bn p
x n
t
+ −= = , (3) 
while the marginal content firm, iy , which is indifferent between being active and 
remaining outside the market, is 
e
c
i cp
an sy n
f
−= = .     (4) 
Each side of the market correctly anticipates its influence on the demand of the other 
side and therefore, ec cn n= and ecp cpn n= . Thus, the number of consumers and active 
content providers is given by the solution to the simultaneous equation system (3) and 
                                                 
16 See Appendix C for a discussion on how positive marginal costs on the content provider side affect 
our results. 
17 Alternatively, the fee to the platform can be specified to be proportional to the number of platform 
customers, j c c jan sn fyπ = − − .  The qualitative results of our main specification go through in this 
alternative specification. 
18 In any case, we can interpret the fee s as the increment above the traditional transit fee. 
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(4), which is  ( ) ( )( , ) and ( , )c cp
f v p bs a v p tsn p s n p s
ft ab ft ab
− − − −= =− − .
19  
 
Given this setup, we now study the monopoly platform optimum, the optimum 
with net neutrality regulation and the social optimum. Then, we consider the welfare 
implications of imposing net neutrality regulation. 
 
2.4 Monopoly Platform Optimum 
Consider first the monopoly platform private optimum under which the 
platform is free to set both the subscription price p  and the fee s  to content 
providers.  The platform faces the problem of choosing p  and s  to maximize  
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )c cpp s p c n p s sn p sΠ = − + .    (5) 
Because the two markets provide complementary products, the monopolist finds an 
inverse relationship between p  and s ; that is, maximizing with respect to p  results 
in a smaller p  when s  is larger, and maximizing with respect to s  results in a 
smaller s  when p  is larger.  Specifically, the optimal p  for the monopolist given s , 
defined by 0p∂Π∂ = , is given by  
( ) ( )( )
2
f v c a b sp s
f
+ − += ,     (6) 
 
and the optimal s  for the monopolist given p , defined by 0s∂Π∂ = , is 
( )( )
2
av bc a b ps p
t
+ − += .     (7) 
Solving the two above equations simultaneously gives the consumers’ 
subscription price and the fee charged to the content providers that maximize the 
platform’s profits:20 
                                                 
19 We check later to ensure that under our assumptions, [ ]0,1cn ∈  and [ ]0,1cpn ∈  in equilibrium. 
20 The second order conditions are satisfied for 24 ( ) 0ft a b− + > . 
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2 2
2
(2 )( )
4 ( )
M ft ab v c b c a vp
ft a b
− + − −= − +     (8) 
and 
   2
( ) ( )
4 ( )
M a b f v cs
ft a b
− −= − +       (9) 
 
Superscript M indicates the fully private optimum where both p  and s  are chosen by 
the monopoly platform.  The participation levels are 
2 2
2 ( ) ( )( )and
4 ( ) 4 ( )
M M
c cp
f v c a b v cn n
ft a b ft a b
− + −= =− + − + , and the profits of the monopoly 
platform are 
2
2
( )
4 ( )
M f v c
ft a b
−Π = − + .
21, 22 
The platform benefits from additional content (since additional content 
increases the willingness to pay of its subscribers) but does not receive the full benefit 
of the content increase.  Therefore, the platform cannot fully internalize the network 
effects of content and charges a positive price to content providers.   
The monopoly platform service provider sets a positive fee to content 
providers for accessing users ( 0Ms > ) only if 1a
b
> .  This means that if content 
providers value additional consumers more highly than consumers value additional 
content providers, the platform will charge content providers a positive price for 
accessing consumers.  It may be argued that consumers have become more valuable to 
content providers lately, so that there are higher incentives for a platform, such as 
AT&T, to seek ways of being able to charge content providers for access to users.  In 
some other networks, for example in the network of a game platform/console (such as 
the Sony PlayStation platform) and games (software), the platform similarly collects a 
fee from independent game developers. 
                                                 
21 To ensure that the market is not covered on either side, we impose 24 ( ) ( )( ) 0ft a b a b v c− + − + − >  
and 24 ( ) 2 ( ) 0ft a b f v c− + − − > , i.e., that the differentiation parameters f and t are sufficiently high. 
22 Note that since 
2
2
( )(2 )
0
4 ( )
M v c ft ab ap c
ft a b
− − −− = >− + , the price consumers pay, 
Mp , is above the 
marginal cost if 2 ( ) 0ft a a b− + >  and above 0 if 2 ( ) ( )( ) 0ft v c a b av bc+ − + + > .  Although a 
negative price might not be implementable, the platform may tie other products with the offer for 
Internet access and thereby, in effect, obtain a negative price.  See Amelio and Jullien (2007). 
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In what follows, and to allow us to focus on the case where a private profit-
maximizing platform wants to charge content providers a positive price ( 0Ms > ), we 
assume that a content provider values an additional consumer more than a consumer 
values an additional content provider: 
 
Assumption 1:  A content provider values an additional consumer more than a 
consumer values an additional content provider: 1a
b
> . 
 
 An alternative interpretation is that more surplus from the interaction between 
consumers and content providers is created on the content provider side of the market. 
It is worth noting that in some two-sided markets, a firm on the other side of the 
market may value an additional platform consumer less than a platform consumer 
values an additional firm on the other side of the market, that is, 1a
b
< .  For example, 
a Windows application (not sold by Microsoft) may value an additional Windows 
purchaser less than this consumer values the existence of this additional application.  
When this is true, the platform will subsidize the firms on other side of the market to 
increase their number and more fully internalize the externality.  Thus, operating 
system companies typically subsidize developers of applications by embedding 
subroutines that are valuable to application developers in the operating systems, but 
not directly valuable to users. 23 Another example is the interaction among a credit 
card platform network (such as VISA), a credit card issuing bank and consumers.  
Some consumers who pay their monthly balances in full are effectively subsidized by 
the issuing banks by receiving airline miles and other perks while the issuers collect 
fees from the merchants.  In this case, the value of an additional consumer to the 
issuing bank exceeds the value of an additional issuing bank to a consumer, i.e., 
                                                 
23 See also Economides and Katsamakas (2006a, b) for a deeper discussion of this issue and a contrast 
with practices in open source operating systems. Also note that in some two-sided markets, the 
organizing networks have arbitrarily set the fee between different network firms without allowing the 
market to set a positive or negative fee across them according to specific circumstances.  This is the 
case in the Visa and MasterCard networks of acquiring and issuing banks.  These networks have set a 
fixed percentage fee between an acquiring and an issuing bank on the dollar value of transactions 
without regard to the specific market position of each pair of such banks.  See Economides (2009) and 
Rochet and Tirole (2003).  
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1a
b
< .24  
 
In summary, we have shown that an unconstrained profit-maximizing 
monopoly platform charges a positive fee to content providers if and only if content 
providers value additional consumers more highly than consumers value additional 
content providers. For an interior maximum, we also need to impose the following 
technical assumption ensuring sufficient differentiation among consumers and content 
providers. 
 
Assumption 2: 2( ) 0ft a b− + > , that is, jointly consumers and content providers are 
sufficiently differentiated. 
 
2.5 Monopoly Platform Optimum under Network Neutrality Regulation 
Now consider the optimal choices of the monopoly platform provider under 
net neutrality regulation, that is, when, by regulation, 0s = .  The objective of the 
platform is now to maximize ( )NN cp c nΠ = − , which gives the equilibrium price 
2
NN v cp += . The second-order condition 2 0f
ft ab
− <−  is satisfied when 0ft ab− > . 
Equilibrium participation levels are ( )
2( )
NN
c
f v cn
ft ab
−= − and 
( )
2( )
NN
cp
a v cn
ft ab
−= − .
25 The 
platform’s profits are 
2( )
4( )
NN f v c
ft ab
−Π = − . 
 
2.6 Social Optimum with a Monopoly Platform 
We now solve for prices p  and s  that maximize the total surplus defined as 
( , )TS p s = ( , ) ( , ) ( , )c cpp s CS p s p sΠ + +Π , where ( , )p sΠ  are platform profits,  
                                                 
24 In this case, we place the consumers at the top of Figure 2 and the credit card issuing banks at the 
bottom. 
25 We need to impose that 2( ) ( ) 0ft ab f v c− − − >  and 2( ) ( ) 0ft ab a v c− − − >  to ensure that the 
markets are not covered. 
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( , )
0
( , ) ( ( , ) )
cn p s
c cpCS p s v bn p s tx p dx= + − −∫    (10) 
is consumer surplus and 
( , )
0
( ( , ) ) ,
cpn p s
cp can p s fy s dyΠ = − −∫     (11) 
is the sum of the content providers’ profits. Maximizing the total surplus,26 a planner 
chooses * 2
( ) ( )
( )
ftc b a b c a a b vp c
ft a b
− + − += <− +  and 
*
2
( ) 0
( )
bf v cs
ft a b
−= − <− + .
  This results 
in maximized total surplus 
2
* *
2
( )( , ) .
2( ( ) )
f v cTS p s
ft a b
−= − +   
Note that in our case, with 1a
b
> , clearly * 0 Ms s< < .  But even in industries 
where 1a
b
<  and the platform monopolist subsidizes the other side of the market, we 
have * 0Ms s< < , that is, the monopolist subsidizes the other side of the market less 
than would the regulator because the monopolist does not fully internalize the 
network externality from the availability of more complementary goods on the other 
side of the market. In general, the unregulated monopolist will impose a higher fee on 
the other side of the market than the regulated monopolists, * ,Ms s<  when 
2( )
( 3 )
a a bft
a b
+> + , that is, when there is a sufficiently high differentiation among 
consumers and content firms. We can also note that constraining the price to 
consumers to equal marginal cost, gives 
2
2
** ( )( ) 0
( 2 )
b a ft v c
s
t ft ab b
+ −= − <− −  since 
2( )ft a b> + .  
                                                 
26 The second-order conditions, 
2
2
( 2 )
0
( )
f ft a ab
ft ab
− −− <− , 
2
2
( 2 )
0
( )
f ft b ab
ft ab
− −− <−  and 
2
2
( )
0
( )
ft a b
ft ab
− + >− , are satisfied if  
2( )ft a b> + , which we assume to be the case.  Further, we impose 
2( ) ( ) 0ft f v c a b− − − + >  and 2( )( ) ( ) 0ft a b v c a b− + − − + >  to ensure that the market is not 
covered at the optimum. 
 17
The maximized surplus is  
2 2
**
2
( )( )( , )
2 ( 2 )
ft a c vTS c s
t ft ab b
+ −= − − .
27  Similarly, if the content 
provider price is constrained to marginal cost (i.e. zero), the socially optimal price to 
consumers is below marginal cost since choosing p  to maximize ( ,0)TS p  gives 
2
2
( )**
2
ft ab c a v abvp c
ft ab a
− − −= <− − .  The maximized surplus is 
2
** ( )( ,0)
2( ( ))
ft c vTS p
ft a a ab
−= − + .
28   
 
Hence, to summarize, it is clear that: 
• A total surplus maximizing planner/regulator in the two-sided market with 
network effects chooses below-cost pricing in both markets. 
• A total surplus maximizing planner/regulator in a two-sided market with 
network effects constrained to marginal cost pricing in the subscription market 
chooses below-cost pricing in the content market. 
• A total surplus maximizing planner/regulator in a two-sided market 
constrained to marginal cost pricing in the content market chooses below-cost 
pricing in the subscription market.29 
 
Due to the network effects arising from the complementarity of the content- 
                                                 
27 The sufficient condition for a maximum is 
2
2
( 2 )
0
( )
t ft ab b
ft ab
− −− <− . 
28 The sufficient condition for a maximum is 
2
2
( 2 )
0
( )
f ft ab a
ft ab
− −− <− .  
29 Comparing  **( , )TS c s  with **( ,0)TS p , we have that 
4 3 2 2
** **
2 2
( 2 )( )( , ) ( ,0) 0
2 ( 2 )(2 )
a a b b ft v cTS c s TS p
t a ab ft ab b ft
+ − −− = − >+ − + −   if 
3
2 ( 2 )
aft a b
b
> + .  The 
percentage gains in total surplus in our model when going from marginal cost pricing on one side of the 
market and optimality on the other to full optimality are 
* * ** 2 2
* * 2
( , ) ( , ) ( ) 0
( , ) ( 2 )
TS p s TS c s a a b
TS p s ft ft ab b
− += >− −  and 
* * ** 2
* * 2
( , ) ( ,0) 0.
( , ) 2
TS p s TS p b
TS p s ft ab a
− = >− −   The percentage gain in total surplus of optimality 
over net neutrality  is  
* * 4 3 2 2 2
* * 2
( , ) ( ,0) 2 (3 ) ( 2 )
( , ) 4( )
NNTS p s TS p a ab ft b ft a b ft
TS p s ft ab
− − + + + += − . 
 18
and Internet subscription market, the planner sets a negative fee to content providers 
* 0s <  and a subscription price below its marginal cost *p c<  to internalize the 
externality of content on subscribers and the externality of subscribers on content. The 
fact that the planner subsidizes content providers suggests that net neutrality (where s  
is set to zero) may also result in a higher surplus than the private optimum.  The fact 
that *s  is negative is not a proof of net neutrality and the surplus will be higher than at 
the private optimum because *s  resulted from the unconstrained maximization of 
total surplus for a planner.  To see whether net neutrality is better in terms of total 
surplus than the private optimum, we need to take into consideration that the 
monopolist is maximizing profits by choosing price Mp , while *s  was calculated 
based on the planner choosing *p .  Thus, we need to define total surplus under the 
maintained condition that notwithstanding the level of s , the monopolist chooses 
price p  to maximize its profits.  The planner then optimizes this constrained total 
surplus function and considers whether setting 0s =  (that is, imposing net neutrality) 
is an improvement over the fully private solution.  This is done in the next section. 
 
2.7 Welfare Implications of Imposing Net Neutrality 
In this subsection, we examine the welfare implications of imposing net 
neutrality in two ways.  First, starting with a regime of net neutrality, we examine the 
incentive of the platform to set a small positive fee to content providers and the 
effects of such an action on total industry surplus. To assess these, we examine the 
incremental change in platform profits and total industry surplus as the fee charged to 
content providers increases from zero to a small positive value.  Naturally, this is done 
under the maintained assumption that the monopoly platform chooses subscription 
price ( )p s  to maximize its profits.  Second, we examine the changes in welfare that 
occur when moving from a privately optimal p , given 0s = , to the full private 
optimum ( Mp and Ms ). 
  
Thus, we first define total surplus under the restriction that, given s, the 
monopolist will set his optimal price for subscription ( )p s , as defined in equation 
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(6a), that is, we define the constrained total surplus function ( ( ), )TS p s s . Then, we 
evaluate the derivatives of the monopolist’s profits and total surplus ( ( ), )TS p s s  with 
respect to the fee s  at 0.   
 
The monopolist’s incentive to increase the fee to content providers from zero 
to a small positive value is 
0
0 0
( ( ), ) ( )( ) ,
2( )
p
s s
d
d p s s a b v c
ds ds ft ab
∂Π=∂
= =
Π
Π − −= = −     (12) 
 
which is positive for 1a
b
> . A planner’s incentives to increase the fee to the content 
providers from zero to a small positive value taking into account that the monopolist 
chooses subscription price ( )p s  is 
2 20
0 0 2
( ( ), ) ( )( ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ) ,
4( )
p
s s
dTS
dTS p s s v c a a ab b a b ft
ds ds ft ab
∂Π=∂
= =
− − + + −= = −  (13) 
which is negative provided that 3a b<  and ft  is sufficiently large.  We also require 
concavity of ( ( ), )TS p s s , for which it is sufficient that 2a b≤ .30  Thus, for (1, 2]a
b
∈  
and ft  sufficiently large, starting from a zero fee under net neutrality, the incentives of 
the platform and society go in opposite directions: the monopolist’s incentive is for 
the platform to charge a positive fee to content providers, while the social incentive is 
for the platform to subsidize content providers.  It follows that net neutrality ( 0s = ) is 
better for society than the profit maximizing solution of the monopoly platform, 
which implies a positive fee to content providers ( 0Ms > ). 
 
Proposition 1: For (1, 2]a
b
∈  and ft  sufficiently large: 
                                                 
30 Note that 
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
( ( ), ) ( 2 )( ) ( 6 3 ) 4( )
0
4 ( )
d TS p s s a a b a b a ab b ft ft
ds f ft ab
− + − − − −= − <  provided that 2a b≤  
and ft sufficiently large. 
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 (i) Starting from the net neutrality regime of a zero fee to content providers, a 
platform monopolist optimally choosing his subscription price would like to 
marginally increase the fee to content providers above zero. 
(ii)Starting from the net neutrality regime of a zero fee to content providers 
and facing a platform monopolist that chooses the subscription price, a total surplus 
maximizing planner/regulator will choose to marginally decrease the fee to content 
providers below zero. 
 
We have shown that a regulator/planner setting a fee s  to content providers 
(expecting the platform monopolist to set his profit-maximizing subscription price 
( )p s ) will choose a negative fee s , i.e., will subsidize the content providers, if 
(1, 2]a
b
∈  and ft  sufficiently large.  We now calculate this fee, ***s and the 
subscription price *** ***( )p p s=  chosen by the monopolist, given this fee.  
Maximizing the constrained total surplus function ( ( ), )TS p s s  with respect to s , we 
find  
2 2
***
2 2 2 2 2
( )( ( 2 ) ( 3 ) )
( 6 3 ) 4 ( 2 )( )
f v c a a ab b a b fts
a ab b ft f t a a b a b
− − + + −= − − + − − +    (14) 
 
and the corresponding monopolist’s subscription price  
 
2 2 3 4 2
***
2 2 2 2 2
( (2 )) (2 (2 ) 2 ) (3 2 ( ))
( 6 3 ) 4 ( 2 )( )
a cft b c v a bft c v cb a v ft b c ft c vp
a ab b ft f t a a b a b
+ + + + − − − − += − − + − − + .(15) 
 
The fee ***s  to content providers is negative provided that 3a
b
<  and ft  is 
sufficiently large.31  Given that the ***s  is negative, the platform profits from 
consumers cover the subsidy to content providers if: 
 
2 2 2 2 2(ft) (3 10 9 4 ) ( )( ( )( 3 4 ) ( 3 )( 4 ) ) 0a ab b ft a a b a a b a ab b a b a b ft− − + − + + − + + − + > ,(16) 
         
                                                                                                                                            
 
31  For *** 0s < , it is sufficient to have 2( ( ) 2 ) (3 )a a a b b ft b a− + < −  which is implied by 
3a b<  and ft  sufficiently large. 
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which is true for a sufficiently large ft.32  Thus, the  platform’s profits  are positive 
even when, following the regulator’s orders, the platform provides subsidy ***s−  to 
the other side of the market.33 
  
Proposition 2:  For (1,3)a
b
∈  and ft sufficiently large, a total surplus maximizing 
planner/regulator, facing a platform monopolist that chooses the subscription price, 
will choose a below-cost fee to content providers, i.e., will subsidize content 
providers.  Even paying the below-cost fee, the platform makes positive profits.  
 
We can also explicitly compare prices, equilibrium participation levels and 
surplus distribution across a setting where the platform is free to set both s  and p , 
and a setting of net neutrality regulation where s  is constrained to equal zero.   We 
then obtain the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3:  Comparing net neutrality and the choice of the monopolist platform, 
we find that the content sector has higher profits at net neutrality, the platform and 
the consumers are better off in monopoly, and total surplus is higher in net neutrality 
for sufficiently large differentiation parameters, ft, and (1,5)a
b
∈ .  
Proof. See appendix A. 
 
It is interesting that the consumer surplus is higher in monopoly while total 
surplus is higher at net neutrality.  In monopoly, consumers benefit from a lower 
                                                 
32 The condition can be reformulated as 
3 2 2 2 2 24(ft) +(3 10 9 )(ft) ( )( 3 )( 4 ) ( ) ( )( 3 4 ) 0a ab b a a b a b a b ft a a b a a b a ab b− − − + − + − + + − + >
or 3 2A(ft) + (ft) ( ) 0B C ft D− − >  with A = 4 > 0. Hence, the expression is positive for ft sufficiently 
large. 
33 We have also considered the possibility that the regulator can set the price to users but allows the 
platform to set a fee to content providers.  In that case, the regulator maximizes l l( , ( ))TS p s p  by 
choosing lp . This leads the regulator to choose a below-cost user price 
l 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
( )(2 2 ( 3 ))( )
(2 ) ( ) ( 3 6 ) 4
0a b a b bft a b ft c v
a b b a b a ab b ft
p
t
c
f
+ + − + −− = − − + + − − + <+  and, in response, the platform chooses 
an above-cost content-provider fee l
2 3
2 2 2 2 2
( 2 )( )
(
(
2 ) ( ) ( 3 6 )
) 0
4
f a b b aft c v
a b b
s
a b a ab b ft f t
p + − −− + + − + += >− . 
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subscription price since the monopolist has incentives to attract more consumers to 
generate extra revenue from charging content providers.  Although charging content 
providers leads to lower content provision, the direct effects of a lower subscription 
price dominates.  In contrast, total surplus takes into account the profits of content 
providers, which are higher under net neutrality.  Thus, despite consumers’ surplus 
and platform profits being lower at net neutrality, the total surplus is higher for this 
parameter range. Note also that for other parameter ranges, such as for smaller ft, the 
total surplus may decrease under net neutrality, as the increase in content provider 
profits is not sufficiently large to compensate for reductions in consumer surplus and 
platform profits. 
 
2.8 Summary of Results for Platform Monopolist 
We have showed that for some parameter values, the private and social 
incentives to set a positive fee to content providers diverge. A private monopolist has 
an incentive to set a positive fee, while a social planner prefers a negative fee.  In 
addition, for a similar range of parameter values, implementing net neutrality 
regulation is beneficial for total welfare.  We have also compared a privately optimal 
solution where the monopolist is free to set the price to consumers and content 
providers to the outcome where a zero fee to content providers is imposed.  The 
comparison showed that removing net neutrality regulation will lead to an increase in 
the fee content providers must pay for access and hence, less content is provided.  The 
price consumers pay for Internet access decreases, so that a larger number of 
consumers purchase Internet access, but they have access to less content.  In the 
aggregate, consumers and the platform are better off and content providers worse off. 
The sum of these changes determines the impact on total welfare. It may be positive 
or negative, but for large ft and when ( (1,5)a
b
∈ ), total welfare is reduced so that net 
neutrality regulation is beneficial for society. 
 
3. Duopoly Platforms with Multi-homing Content Providers 
We now extend our model to duopoly competition between two platforms 
with multi-homing content providers. We assume that consumers single-home i.e. 
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each consumer buys Internet access from one platform only.  Content and applications 
providers, however, are assumed to multi-home, i.e., they sell through both platforms, 
paying the fees charged by platforms.  As in monopoly, we assume that platforms 
only offer linear subscription prices and content provider fees. 
  
Content providers value consumers to the extent that they are willing to pay 
both platforms to reach all consumers instead of only paying one platform and 
reaching a subset of consumers (only the consumers subscribing to that platform).  In 
other words, each (atomistic) content provider decides to join each platform 
independently of joining the other.  
 
3.1 Consumers 
There are two platforms (1 and 2) located at 0x =  and 1x = .  We assume that 
each platform offers the same intrinsic benefit  v  to consumers.  Given an expected 
number of content providers ecpkn  in each platform k , {1,2}k ∈ , the marginal 
consumer, indifferent between buying from platform 1 or 2, is located at ix  that obeys  
 
1 1 2 2(1 ) .
e e
cp i cp iv bn tx p v bn t x p+ − − = + − − −    (17) 
 
Assuming full market coverage, the sales of the two platforms are 
2 1 2 1
1
( ) ( )1
2 2
e e
cp cp
c
b n n p p
n
t
− − −= −  and 2 11c cn n= − . 
3.2 Content Providers 
Content providers are defined as in the monopoly model above, that is, they 
are heterogeneous with respect to the fixed costs for setting up shop.  The expected 
number of consumers that are able to reach each content provider is eckn , if the content 
provider buys access from platform k , {1,2}k ∈ .  The total revenue for each content 
provider is eckan . 
Platform k  collects a fee ks  from each content provider to allow access to its 
users.  Thus, a content provider j’s profit from selling through platform k  is 
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.ejk ck k jan s fyπ = − −       (18) 
 
Each content provider with 0jkπ ≥  sets up its business, pays platform k  for access to 
its consumers and makes non-negative profits from sales to those consumers.  Thus, 
the marginal content firm which is indifferent between being active and staying out of 
the market is ,
e
ck k
cpk
an sn
f
−= {1,2}k ∈ . Since consumers single-home, content 
providers can only reach the consumers of each platform by buying access from that 
platform.34 
 
3.3 Demand 
At the equilibrium, each side of the market correctly anticipates its influence on the 
demand of the other side and therefore, eck ckn n=  and ecpk cpkn n= , {1,2}k ∈ .  Thus, the 
number of consumers and active content providers is given by the solution to the 
simultaneous equation system of (43, 44) and (46, 47) which is 
2 1 2 1
1
( ) ( )1
2 2( )c
b s s f p pn
ft ab
− + −= + − ,
2 1 2 1
2
( ) ( )1 ,
2 2( )c
b s s f p pn
ft ab
− + −= − −  
2
1 2 2 1 1
1
( ( ) ( )) ( 2 )
2 ( )cp
a b s s f t p p a b ftsn
f ft ab
+ + + − − += −  and 
2
1 2 1 2 2
2
( ( ) ( )) ( 2 )
2 ( )cp
a b s s f t p p a b ftsn
f ft ab
+ + + − − += − . 
 Given this setup, we first consider the unrestricted duopoly equilibrium, then the 
duopoly equilibrium under net neutrality regulation and finally we study the welfare 
implications of imposing net neutrality regulation. 
 
                                                 
34 A “competitive bottleneck” arises as there is no competition for content providers since they make a 
decision to join one platform independently of the decision to join the other.  This phenomenon is 
common in, for example, competing mobile telecommunications networks (receivers join one network 
but callers may call all networks) and newspapers (a consumer may subscribe to only one newspaper 
but advertisers may advertise in all newspapers).  See Armstrong (2006). 
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3.4 Unrestricted Duopoly Equilibrium 
When the duopoly platforms are free to set prices to both consumers and content 
providers, platform k maximizes 1 2 1 2( , , , ) ( ) ,k k ck k cpkp p s s p c n s nΠ = − +  with 
k = 1, 2, resulting in equilibrium prices 
2
1 2 1 2
3 and .
4 4
D D D Da ab a bp p t c s s
f
+ −= = + − = = 35,36 The firms split the market on 
the consumer side and the profits are  
2
1 2
4 ( ) 4( ) .
16
D D ft a b ft ab
f
− + + −Π = Π =  
 
3.5 Duopoly under Network Neutrality Regulation 
Under net neutrality regulation, 1 2 0s s= = , and the duopolists independently set their 
prices to consumers to maximize 1 1 1( ) cp c nΠ = −  and  2 2 2( ) cp c nΠ = − with respect 
to 1p  and 2p , respectively, resulting in equilibrium prices of 
1 2 .
DNN DNN abp p t c
f
= = + − 37 The firms split the market equally on the consumer side 
and their profits are  1 2
1 ( )
2
DNN DNN abt
f
Π = Π = − . 
 
                                                 
35 The second-order conditions are 0
f
ft ab
− − < ,  
(2 )
0
( )
ft ab
f ft ab
−− − <  and 
2
2
(4 ( ) ) 4( )
0
4( )
ft a b ft ab
ab ft
− + + −
− >  and are satisfied since we have assumed that 
24 ( ) 0ft a b− + > . 
 
36 Note that the equilibrium platform prices given 1s  and 2s  are 
 
1 2
1 1 2
3 (2 ) ( )( , )
3
ab a b s a b sp s s t c
f
⎛ ⎞+ + + −= + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , 
2 1
2 1 2
3 (2 ) ( )( , )
3
ab a b s a b sp s s t c
f
⎛ ⎞+ + + −= + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
 
37 The second-order condition, 0
f
ft ab
− − < , is satisfied since we have assumed throughout 
that 0ft ab− > . 
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3.6 Welfare Implications of Imposing Network Neutrality in Duopoly 
In this section, we proceed as in monopoly by first looking at incentives to set 
a positive fee to content providers and then making point-to-point comparisons 
between the duopoly equilibrium outcome under net neutrality regulation 
( 1 2 0s s= = ) and under no regulation. 
We start by comparing the private and the social incentives to set a positive 
fee to content providers.  The individual incentive for a platform (either 1 or 2) to 
increase its fee to content providers from zero to a small positive value when the 
opponent is charging a zero fee is 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 20 0
0 0
1 2
0
3
p p p p
s s s s
d d
a b
ds ds f
∂Π ∂Π ∂Π ∂Π= = = =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= = = =
Π Π
−= = >   (19) 
 
We define total surplus (TS ) as consisting of the consumer surplus 
 
1
c1
1
1 1 2 2
0 n
( ) ( (1 ) ) ,
cn
cp cpCS v bn tx p dx v bn t x p dx= + − − + + − − −∫ ∫   (20) 
the sum of platform profits, 
 
1 1 1 1 1( ) ,c cpp c n s nΠ = − +   2 2 2 2 2( ) c cpp c n s nΠ = − +     (21) 
 
and total content provider profits 
 
1 2
1 1 2 2
0 0
( ) ( ) .
cp cpn n
cp c can s fy dy an s fy dyΠ = − − + − −∫ ∫     (22) 
 
Starting with a regime of net neutrality, we examine the incentive of each 
duopolist to set a small positive fee to content providers and the effects of such an 
action on the total industry surplus.  To assess these effects, we examine the 
incremental change in a duopolist’s profits and in the total industry surplus as the fee 
charged by this duopolist to content providers increases from zero to a small positive 
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value.  Naturally, the total surplus comparison is made under the maintained 
assumption that duopolists choose their equilibrium subscription prices 
1 1 2 2 1 2( , ), ( , )p s s p s s .  The derivatives of a constrained total surplus 
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2( ( , ), ( , ), , )TS p s s p s s s s  with respect to fees 1s  and 2s , respectively, evaluated at 
1 2 0s s= = , are38 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
0 0
0 0
1 2
0.
2
p p p p
s s s s
dTS dTS
b
ds s f
∂Π ∂Π ∂Π ∂Π= = = =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= = = == = − <∂    (23) 
 
Hence, as in monopoly, social and private incentives go in opposite directions in 
duopoly, if 1a
b
> .  The social incentives are to reduce the fees to content providers 
below zero, while each duopolist has an incentive to increase its fee to content 
providers above zero if the rival has a zero fee.  Therefore, net neutrality is desirable 
from a social perspective but undesirable for each duopolist. 
 
Proposition 4:   
(i) Starting from the net neutrality regime of a zero fee to content providers by 
platform duopolists, each duopolist would like to marginally increase its fee to 
content providers above zero. 
(ii) Starting from the net neutrality regime of a zero fee to content providers 
and facing platform duopolists that choose subscription prices non-cooperatively, a 
total surplus maximizing planner will choose to marginally decrease the fee to content 
providers below zero. 
 
 A planner, anticipating the duopolists’ subscription equilibrium prices, 
chooses negative fees to content providers, 1 2 02
bs s= = − < , to maximize the 
constrained total surplus function 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2( ( , ), ( , ), , )TS p s s p s s s s .  Imposing these fees 
                                                 
38 The constrained total surplus function 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2( ( , ), ( , ), , )TS p s s p s s s s  is concave under  
assumptions 4 2 2(5 18 ) (15 4 ) ( 32 ) 0a ft b ft ab a b a a b ft+ − − + − − <  and 
4 2 2 2 2 22 (3 2 ) ( 14 5 ) 9 0a ab a b a ab b ft f t− + − − − − < .  In addition, to ensure that the market is not 
covered on the content providers’ side, we assume that 2 0a b f+ − > . 
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results in duopoly equilibrium subscription prices 1 2 2
abp p t c
f
= = + − .  Even paying 
the subsidy to content providers, the profits of the duopoly platforms are positive at 
the resulting equilibrium, 
2
1 2
2 (2 ) 0
4
ft ab b
f
− +Π = Π = > . 
 
 Proposition 5:  A total surplus maximizing planner, facing platform duopolists 
that choose their subscription prices based on the planner’s choice of a fee to content 
providers, will choose a below-cost fee to content providers. Even paying the below-
cost fee, the duopolists make positive profits. 
 
 We now consider the incentives of a duopolist to increase its fee to content 
providers, given a possibly positive fee by its competitor.  We evaluate 
1 2
1 2
1
1 20
2
0
1
( )( )
3 9 ( )
p p
s
d
a b sa b
ds f f ft ab
∂Π ∂Π= =∂ ∂
=
Π
−−= − −      (24) 
 
and therefore,  
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 1 2
1 1 20 0
2
0 0
1 1
( ) 0
9 ( )
p p p p
s s s
d d
a b s
ds ds f ft ab
∂Π ∂Π ∂Π ∂Π= = = =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= = =
Π Π
−− = − <−   (25) 
 
Thus, for 1a
b
> , platform 1 has a lower incentive to set a positive fee to content 
providers if platform 2 quotes a positive fee to content providers.  Imposing net 
neutrality on platform 1’s competitor will strengthen platform 1’s incentives to 
increase the fee to content providers.  Thus, the incentive of a duopolist to depart from 
net neutrality is higher when the opponent observes net neutrality and not when the 
opponent charges a positive fee to content providers.  Conversely, an action by 
duopolists to simultaneously depart from net neutrality is not supported by individual 
non-cooperative incentives and therefore, if it occurs, it arouses the suspicion of 
collusion on the content side of the market.  We discuss collusion on one side of the 
market with competition on the other side of the market in the next section. 
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Proposition 6:  The incentive of a duopolist to increase its fee to content 
providers above zero decreases as the rival duopolist charges a higher fee. 
 
 Now, we make a point-to-point comparison between unconstrained duopoly 
and the market equilibrium under net neutrality.  As in the monopoly model, we 
compare changes in price to consumers and fees to content providers when moving 
from a regime with net neutrality to a regime of no regulation.  We obtain the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 7:  Comparing unconstrained duopoly with duopoly under net 
neutrality, we find that the total surplus is higher in net neutrality and the content 
sector and the platforms have higher profits. Consumers are worse off under net 
neutrality. 
 
Proof. See appendix A. 
 
Thus, under no regulation, competition for consumers is more intense since profits 
from content providers can be competed away.  As a result, consumers enjoy lower 
prices and are better off under no regulation than under net neutrality.  Net neutrality 
regulation relaxes price competition, leading to higher profits for platforms. Platforms 
are better off under net neutrality, which is the opposite to the case in the monopoly 
model. 
 
An important note is that we assume full market coverage on the consumer 
side, which implies that price reductions to consumers will only lead to surplus 
transfers between consumers and platforms. In contrast, on the content provider side, 
fee increases lead to reductions in the surplus. In the appendix, we provide a detailed 
discussion of the implications for our results when the market is not fully covered so 
that there are demand expansion effects also on the consumer side of the market. Our 
results are similar when accounting for this effect. 
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3.7 Collusion on Fees to Content Providers 
As we have shown, duopolist platforms like the net neutrality regime because 
it allows them to charge higher subscription prices.  However, the individual incentive 
of each firm is to increase its fee to content providers and depart from net neutrality, 
provided that the opponent remains at net neutrality.  Therefore, in a two-strategy 
game where each duopolist can set 0DNNis =  or the non-cooperative equilibrium fee 
D
is , both firms choose 
D
is  leading to a prisoners’ dilemma equilibrium with lower 
profits for both platforms than when both play 0DNNis = .  We show below that 
collusion between platforms will also result in zero fees to content providers if the 
platforms are constrained to choose non-negative fees. 
Suppose that the duopolists first collude on fees to content providers, i.e., set 
cooperatively 1s  and 2s  to maximize the joint profits 1 2Π +Π , and then set 
subscription fees non-cooperatively.39  Given subscription fees 1s  and 2s , the non-
cooperative equilibrium subscription prices are 
 
2 1 1 2
1 1 2
( ) (3 2 )( , )  ,
3
b s s a b s sp s s t c
f
− − + += + +   and   (26) 
1 2 2 1
2 1 2
( ) (3 2 )( , )  
3
b s s a b s sp s s t c
f
− − + += + + .    (27) 
 
Substituting these in joint profits 1 2Π +Π and maximizing with respect to 1s  and 2s , 
we find that the joint profit maximizing fee for the platforms is zero:  
1 2 0
DCO DCO DCOs s s= = = .  Therefore, the firms cannot improve over net neutrality if 
they collude.  
 
Proposition 8:  Duopolists colluding in setting fees to content providers while 
competing non-cooperatively in subscription prices will choose zero fees if they are 
constrained not to choose non-negative fees.  Thus, the duopolists cannot improve 
over net neutrality by cooperating in linear fees to content providers. 
 
                                                 
39 Consumers and content providers form expectations and make their decisions subsequently. 
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3.7 Summary of Results for Platform Duopoly 
Extending the monopoly model to a duopoly setup, we showed that most of 
our results are robust to the introduction of competition between platforms.40  In 
platform duopoly, we find that for 1a
b
> , the private and social incentives to set a 
positive fee to content providers diverge.  A social planner would prefer a negative 
fee, while competing duopolists would like to choose a positive fee.  Hence, net 
neutrality regulation is beneficial for social welfare even when some competition is 
present in the platform market.  Comparisons between outcomes under the private 
equilibrium with two-sided pricing and the private equilibrium under net neutrality 
regulation indicated that a removal of net neutrality regulation would lead to a lower 
subscription price for consumers, but less content available due to an increase in fees 
to content providers.  Content providers are worse off in the aggregate, while 
consumers are better off.  Social welfare is reduced, thereby supporting the result that 
net neutrality regulation is good for total welfare. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
We developed a model of a two-sided market to assess the potential benefits 
of the Internet departing from “net neutrality” whereby broadband Internet access 
providers (telephone and cable TV companies) do not charge a positive fee to content 
and application providers.  We explicitly allowed monopoly and duopoly access 
providers to charge a positive fee to content and applications providers.  This was 
contrasted to a setup where a regulator chooses the fee to content providers to 
maximize the total surplus, taking into account the pricing of a monopolist or 
duopolists in the consumer subscription side of the market.  We showed that under 
these conditions and for reasonable parameter ranges, the regulator will choose a 
negative fee to content providers while a monopolist or duopolists will choose 
positive fees.  We also showed that for some parameter values, society is better off in 
terms of total surplus at net neutrality rather than either the monopolist’s or 
                                                 
40 This echoes earlier theoretical evidence suggesting that introducing competition in a two-sided 
market does not necessarily lead to a pricing structure that is closer to the socially optimal one.  See, 
for example, Wright (2004), Armstrong (2006) or Hagiu (2007).  
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duopolists’ choices of positive fees to content providers. However, there are also 
parameter ranges for which the opposite result is obtained. 
 
As noted in the introduction, the economics literature on net neutrality 
regulation is still in its early stages.  Further rigorous economic analysis is needed on 
issues such as the impact of net neutrality regulation on innovation among content 
providers, non-linear platform pricing and congestion and broadband penetration. In 
particular, the issue of price discrimination and two-part tariffs to consumers and 
content providers is important. Our results rely quite extensively on the platform not 
being able to appropriate the entire surplus from consumers and content providers. 
Hence, our results might not be robust to an extensive use of price discrimination and 
two-part tariffs by the platform. We believe, however, that our results still hold if 
some surplus is left to consumers and content providers. Nevertheless, our focus has 
been on the two-sided nature of the market and we believe it to be important for future 
studies to account for this. A one-sided analysis of two-sided markets may easily lead 
to incorrect conclusions.41  
 
 
  
                                                 
41 See e.g. Wright (2004). 
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APPENDIX 
A. Proof of Propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. Starting with net neutrality, consider the impact of removing 
net neutrality regulation i.e., compare the results from above with the results from the 
privately optimal solution. The difference in equilibrium price to consumers and fee 
to content providers as we go away from net neutrality is  
 
2
( )( )( ) 0,
2(4 ( ) )
M NN a b a b v cp p p
ft a b
− + −Δ = − = − <− +   
 
2
( ) ( ) 0,
4 ( )
M NN M a b f v cs s s s
ft a b
− −Δ = − = = >− +   
 
while the difference in equilibrium participation levels is  
 
2
2 1( )( ) 0,
4 ( ) 2( )
M NN
c c cn n n f v c ft a b ft ab
Δ = − = − − >− + −   
 
2( )( ) 0.4 ( ) 2( )
M NN
cp cp cp
a b an n n v c
ft a b ft ab
+Δ = − = − − <− + −
42 
 
The equilibrium profits of the platform are, of course, higher when it is unconstrained:  
2
2
1 1( ) ( ) 0.
4 ( ) 4( )
M NN f v c
ft a b ft ab
ΔΠ = Π −Π = − − >− + −  
Total consumer surplus and content provider profits under private optimum are  
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 ( ) ( ) ( )and
(4 ( ) ) 2(4 ( ) )
M M
c cp
f t v c a b f v cCS
ft a b ft a b
− + −= Π =− + − +  
                                                 
42 This is implied by 2 ( ) 0ft a a b− + >  which is implied by 2( )ft a b> +  that was assumed for the 
second-order conditions of the unconstrained total surplus optimization.  
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and under net neutrality regulation 
2 2 2 2
2 2
( ) ( )and .
8( ) 8( )
NN NN
c cp
f t v c a f v cCS
ab ft ab ft
− −= Π =− −  
The change in consumer surplus when net neutrality regulation is removed is then43  
 
2 2
2 2 2
1 16 1( ) ( ) 0
8 (4 ( ) ) ( )
M NN
c c cCS CS CS f t v c ft a b ft ab
Δ = − = − − >− + −  
and the change in content provider profits 
 
2 2
2
2 2 2
1 4( )( ) ( ) 0.
8 (4 ( ) ) ( )
M NN
cp cp cp
a b af v c
ft a b ft ab
+ΔΠ = Π −Π = − − <− + −
44  
 
We now calculate the change in total surplus that occurs when net neutrality 
regulation is removed.  Total surplus under the private optimum is  
2 2
2 2
(12 ( ) )( )
2(4 ( ) )
M f ft a b v cTS
ft a b
− + −= − +   
and under net neutrality regulation  
2 2
2
( ) ( 2 3 ) .
8( )
NN f v c a ab ftTS
ft ab
− − += −  
The change in total surplus is then 
2 2 2
2 2 2
( ) 4(12 ( ) ) ( 2 3 ) 0,
8 (4 ( ) ) ( )
M NN f v c ft a b a ab ftTS TS TS
ft a b ft ab
⎛ ⎞− − + − +Δ = − = − <⎜ ⎟− + −⎝ ⎠
 
which is negative provided that 5a
b
<  and ft  is sufficiently large.45  Thus, removing 
                                                 
43 Note that 
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
16 1 ( ) (4( ) (4 ( ) ))
0
(4 ( ) ) ( ) (4 ( ) ) ( )
a b ft ab ft a b
ft a b ft ab ft a b ft ab
− − + − +− = >− + − − + −  since  
24 ( ) 0ft a b− + > .  
44 This is implied by 2 ( ) 0ft a a b− + > , which is implied by 2( )ft a b> +  that was assumed for the 
second-order conditions of the unconstrained total surplus optimization. 
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net neutrality regulation decreases social welfare for this parameter range, while 
social welfare is increased otherwise. 
 
Proof of Proposition 7. Since the market is covered in both regimes, consumer 
participation does not change.  The differences in equilibrium prices to consumers and 
fees to content providers are 
1 1 1 2 2 2
( ) 0
4
D DNN D DNN a a bp p p p p p
f
−Δ = − = Δ = − = − < , 
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 04
D DNN D DNN D D a bs s s s s s s s −Δ = − = Δ = − = = = > , 
and the difference in content provider participation is 
1 1 1 2 2 2
( ) 0
4
D DNN D DNN
cp cp cp cp cp cp
a bn n n n n n
f
−Δ = − = Δ = − = − < . 
The differences in consumer surplus, platform profits and content provider 
profits are  
2( ) 0,
16
D DNN a bCS CS CS
f
−Δ = − = >   
2
1 1 1 2 2 2
( ) 0,
16
D DNN D DNN a b
f
−ΔΠ = Π −Π = ΔΠ = Π −Π = − <  
 
and  
( )(3 ) 0
16
D DNN
cp cp cp
a b a b
f
− +ΔΠ = Π −Π = − < .  
 
Total welfare is reduced when the net neutrality regulation is removed since 
 
( )(3 ) 0.
16
D DNN a b a bTS TS TS
f
− +Δ = − = − <  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
45 Under assumptions a b>  and 2( ) 0ft a b− + > , for condition 0TSΔ <  to hold, it is sufficient 
that 2 2 2 2 2 24( 5 )( ) ( 23 3 ) ( ) ( 2 ) 0a b ft b a ab b ft a a b a ab b− + + + − + + + < , which holds for 
sufficiently large ft and 5a b< . 
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B. Duopoly Model with Demand Expansion Effects (Hinterlands) on the 
Consumer Side of the Market  
 
Here, we consider the model of duopoly under the assumption that the market 
on the consumer side is not covered, i.e., we account for demand expansion effects on 
the consumer side as is already done on the content provider side.  We show that our 
main conclusions do not change under this scenario. 
 
In contrast to the duopoly model presented above, where the platforms were 
located at the end points of the unit interval over which consumers are uniformly 
distributed, we here locate the platforms at a distance 1
2
d <  from the endpoints.  We 
assume that d  and t  are sufficiently large so that the market is never covered and the 
platforms compete for consumers located between them.  Hence, there will be three 
marginal consumers denoted 1x , 2x  and 3x .  The consumer located at 1x  is indifferent 
between buying from platform 1 and staying out of the market.  The consumer located 
at 2x  is indifferent between the two platforms and the consumer located at 3x  is 
indifferent between staying out of the market and buying from platform 2.  Given our 
utility specification, the locations of these indifferent consumers are given by 
 
1 1
1
e
cpv bn px d
t
+ −= −  
2 1 2 1
2
( ) ( )1
2 2
e e
cp cpb n n p px
t
− − −= −  
2 2
3 (1 )
e
cpv bn px d
t
+ −= − +  
 
and demand on the consumer side is 1 2 1cn x x= −  and 2 3 2cn x x= − . The content 
provider side remains the same as in section 3.  
 
 We can obtain expressions for the number of active consumers and content 
providers as functions of all four prices. These are 
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1 1 1 2 1 2
1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
2 (2 (2 2 2 )) ( ( 3 ) ( 3 2 2 ))( , , , )
4 6 2c
ab bs f p t dt v ft b s s f p p t dt vn p p s s
a b abft f t
+ − + − + − + + − + + − += − +
 
2 2
1 1 1 2 1 2
1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 (2 2 2 ) ( (3 ) ( 3 2 2 ))( , , , )
4 6 2cp
fs t a b p t dt v at b s s f p p t dt vn p p s s
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2 2 1 2 1 2
2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
2 (2 (2 2 2 )) ( ( 3 ) ( 3 2 2 ))( , , , )
4 6 2c
ab bs f p t dt v ft b s s f p p t dt vn p p s s
a b abft f t
+ − + − + − + − + − += − +
 
2 2
2 2 1 2 1 2
2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 (2 2 2 ) ( ( 3 ) ( 3 2 2 ))( , , , )
4 6 2cp
fs t a b p t dt v at b s s f p p t dt vn p p s s
a b abft f t
− + − + − + + + − + − += − +
 
 
 The consumer surplus is  
 
2
1
3
2
1 1 1 1
(1 )
2 2 2 2
(1 )
( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
( ((1 ) ) ) ( ( (1 )) )
xd
cp cp
x d
xd
cp cp
x d
CS v bn t d x p dx v bn t x d p dx
v bn t d x p dx v bn t x d p dx
−
−
= + − − − + + − − −
+ + − − − − + + − − − −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 
 
and the content provider profits are 
 
1 2
1 1 2 2
0 0
( ) ( ) .
cp cpn n
cp c can s fy dy an s fy dyΠ = − − + − −∫ ∫  
 
Total surplus is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, platform profits and content 
provider profits. 
 
We first solve for equilibrium prices and fees in the unrestricted duopoly 
equilibrium.  Platform k choose prices and fees to maximize 
 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( , , , ) ( ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )k k ck k cpkp p s s p c n p p s s s n p p s sΠ = − +  
 
resulting in symmetric equilibrium prices of 
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2 3 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 2 2
(8 ( 22 9 18 18 )) 4 ( 2 2 ) (3 ( 2 2 ) 4 (2 2
8 ( ) 2(3 20 3 ) 20
D D ab b c ft c t dt v a b t dt v a ft t dt v b c tp p
ab a b a ab b ft f t
+ − − + − + − + + − + − + + −= = + − + + +
 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2
( ) (4 3 )(2 (2 1) 2 )
8 ( ) 2(3 20 3 ) 20
D D a b f ab ft c d t vs s
ab a b a ab b ft f t
− − + − −= = + − + + + .
46 
 
Under net neutrality regulation ( 1 2 0s s= = ), equilibrium subscription prices 
are obtained by each platform setting the price to maximize 
 
1 2 1 2( , ,0,0) ( ) ( , ,0,0)k k ckp p p c n p pΠ = −  
 
resulting in  symmetric subscription prices of 
 
1 2
( 3 2 2 ) 2 (2 2 2 )
8 5
DNN DNN ft c t dt v ab c t dt vp p
ab ft
− − + − + + − += = − .
47 
 
We now compare the unconstrained duopoly and the market equilibrium under 
net neutrality.  Through rather tedious calculations, it can be shown that for a 
sufficiently large transportation cost parameter, the differences in equilibrium prices 
to consumers and fees to content providers are 
 
1 1 1 2 2 2 0
D DNN D DNNp p p p p pΔ = − = Δ = − < , 
1 1 1 2 2 2 0
D DNN D DNNs s s s s sΔ = − = Δ = − >  
 
                                                 
46 The second-order conditions are 
1 2( ) 0
2
f
ab ft ab ft
+ <− − , 
(3 2 ) 0
( )(2 )
t ab ft
ab ft ab ft
− <− − , and 
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
(3 4 )(4 ( ) 3( 6 ) 8 ) 0
4( ) ( 2 )
ft ab ab a b a ab b ft f t
ab ft ft ab
− + − + + + >− − .  To satisfy the second-order 
conditions, we need to impose 2 0ft ab− >  and  
2 2 2 2 24 ( ) 3( 6 ) 8 0ab a b a ab b ft f t+ − + + + > , that is, that the heterogeneity parameters are 
sufficiently large. 
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and the differences in consumer and content provider participation are 
 
1 1 1 2 2 2 0
D DNN D DNN
c c c c c cn n n n n nΔ = − = Δ = − > , 
1 1 1 2 2 2 0
D DNN D DNN
cp cp cp cp cp cpn n n n n nΔ = − = Δ = − < . 
 
The differences in consumer surplus, platform profits and content provider profits are  
 
0,D DNNCS CS CSΔ = − >  
1 1 1 2 2 2 0
D DNN D DNNΔΠ = Π −Π = ΔΠ = Π −Π > , 
0D DNNcp cp cpΔΠ = Π −Π < . 
0D DNNTS TS TSΔ = − < .48 
 
Under no regulation, the competition for consumers is more intense since 
profits from content providers can be competed away.  As a result, consumers enjoy 
lower prices and are better off under no regulation than under net neutrality.  
Platforms are also better off under no regulation.  This is the opposite result to that of 
the case when the market was covered due to profits from more consumers entering 
the market.  Content providers are worse off and total welfare is reduced. 
                                                                                                                                            
47 The second-order conditions 
1 2( ) 0
2
f
ab ft ab ft
+ <− −  are satisfied for 2 0ft ab− > . 
48 Total welfare is reduced when net neutrality regulation is removed if 3 23 0a b− <  and 
differentiation parameters f and t are sufficiently large so that  
2 4 3 2 2 3 4
3 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 3 2 2 2 2
4 3 2 2 3 4 2 2
8 (3 18 18 54 11 )
(39 31 491 21 ) 5(3 23 ) 16 ( ) ( 2 )
(9 133 48 730 76 ) .
a b a a b a b ab b ft
a a b ab b f t a b f t a b a b a ab b
a a a b a b ab b f t
+ + + + +
− + + + − < + + + +
+ + + +
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C. Positive Marginal Costs on the Content Provider Side 
 
In this part of the appendix, we discuss the effects on our model of incorporating 
marginal costs on the content provider side of the market. Since our model is set up 
such that we only consider fees to content providers in excess of the costs related to 
receiving and sending traffic, it is difficult to imagine positive marginal costs of 
serving content providers in our setup. However, suppose there to be a marginal cost, 
k, related to serving content providers. Then, 
 
• Proposition 1 holds for f(a-b)(v-c)+(2ft-a^2-ab)k>0 and k sufficiently small. 
• Proposition 2 holds for small k. 
• Proposition 3 holds in that platform profits are higher in monopoly. Content 
sector profits and consumer surplus may be higher or lower under net 
neutrality and the total surplus may also be higher or lower depending on the 
value of k. 
• Proposition 4 holds for b-2k>0 (if k is sufficiently small).  
• Proposition 5 holds for b-2k>0 (if k is sufficiently small).  
• Proposition 6 holds. 
• Proposition 7 holds for 6k<a+3b (if k is sufficiently small).  
• Proposition 8 will not hold. Instead of colluding on setting zero fees to content 
providers, they will optimally set positive fees to content providers equaling 
(1/2)k due to the positive marginal costs of serving content providers. 
 
To summarize, for most of our results to hold, we need the potential marginal cost on 
the consumer side of the market to be sufficiently small. Note also that in our original 
setup, net neutrality regulation might possibly be interpreted as marginal cost pricing. 
However, we do not encourage such an interpretation since one central aspect of net 
neutrality regulation is whether Internet Service Providers should be able to charge 
content providers or not. Hence, net neutrality regulation should be interpreted as the 
inability to set positive (or negative) prices to content providers. Marginal cost pricing 
would involve a potentially positive fee, which is not consistent with our definition of 
net neutrality. 
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D. Monopoly Platform Located at Center of Hotelling Line 
 
In this appendix, we consider the monopoly platform as being located not at one end 
of the unit interval ( 0x = ), but at the centre of the line ( 1
2
x = ). This implies that the 
demand functions facing such a monopoly platform become 
 
2( ( ) )( , )
2c
f v p bsn p s
ft ab
− −= −  and 
2 ( )( , )
2cp
a v p stn p s
ft ab
− −= −  
 
and the consumer surplus becomes 
 
2
2
( ( ))( , )
( 2 )c
t bs f p vCS p s
ft ab
+ −= − . 
 
Then, going though the calculations with these new expressions for demand and 
consumer surplus allows us to check that propositions 1-5 still hold. 
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